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In corporate practice, incentive schemes are often complicated even for simple
tasks. Hence, the way they are communicated might matter. In a controlled
field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication
of a well-established incentive scheme – a reminder regarding the piece rate at
the beginning of the shift. The experiment was conducted in a large firm where
experienced managers work in a team production setting and where incentives
for both quantity and quality of output are provided. While the treatment
conveyed no additional material information and left the incentive system
unchanged, it had significant positive effects on quantity and on managers’
compensation. These effects are economically sizable and robust to alternative
empirical specifications. We consider various potential mechanisms, where our
preferred explanation – improved salience of incentives – is consistent with all
of the findings.
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1 Introduction
Motivation Incentive schemes designed to enhance workforce performance are a
key element of corporate personnel policy and have received considerable attention
in academic research. In particular, a growing empirical literature studies the ef-
fectiveness of incentive schemes and sheds light on important behavioral aspects.
However, most of this evidence is based on fairly straightforward incentive schemes
and drastic interventions, as for example in Lazear’s (2000) seminal Safelite study.1
In corporate practice, however, many incentive schemes (and the organizational
structures in which they are implemented) are complex even for simple tasks. While
the focus in the theoretical literature has been on the optimal design of incentive
schemes, the empirical question whether existing incentives in fact lead to optimal
performance by the workforce has not received much attention.
In this paper, we investigate whether a minimally invasive change in the way an
elaborate and well-established incentive scheme is communicated has measurable
effects. The evidence stems from a controlled field experiment conducted in a large
firm. Over the years, the firm had developed an incentive scheme for managers,
who were each responsible for a team in a multi-dimensional production process
where both quantity and quality of output are important. While keeping the ma-
terial incentive structure – under which managers had worked for several years –
unchanged, the experiment varied how critical information about the existing per-
formance scheme was communicated. In particular, the only change that happened
in the randomized intervention was that a reminder about the prevailing piece rate
was posted at the beginning of the shift; a crucial information that managers already
had absent the treatment. That is, the intervention did not convey any additional
material information to them.
Given the experience of managers and as incentive pay constitutes a substan-
tial fraction of their income, under the null hypothesis, the performance and the
earnings of these managers should not be affected by a reminder about the piece
rate. That is, this variation in the way incentives are communicated should have
no impact on performance. The results document, however, that the intervention
had economically and statistically significant effects on outcomes in a real-world
1See also, e.g., Paarsch and Shearer (2000), Shearer (2004), Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul
(2005), and Bellemare and Shearer (2011). See Prendergast (1999) for a survey of the earlier
literature. Charness and Kuhn (2010) provide an overview of the (lab and field) experimental
evidence on behavioral aspects and unintended consequences of incentive provision.
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production environment with substantial monetary incentives, even though the ex-
isting incentive system remained unchanged throughout the treatment and control
periods and across treatment and control teams.
The Firm The experiment was conducted in cooperation with a large European
agricultural firm whose main product is lettuce. The harvesting of lettuce is done
by teams of harvest workers that work together on a harvest machine and perform
various tasks. Each of the teams (which work on different fields in the same region)
is led by a manager who is responsible for this one team only and serves as the crucial
link between the firm and workers. The respective manager oversees the operations
of the team. In particular, the manager is responsible for the harvest performance
and takes the relevant operative decisions (e.g., the speed of the harvest machine,
the matching of workers to tasks, and the training of incoming workers) for his entire
team. The manager of the team also communicates the output requirements as well
as the incentive structure to the workers (see Section 3.1 for details).
The firm cares both about the harvested quantity and quality because it faces
severe contractual penalties for inferior quality delivered to large supermarket chains.
Accordingly, incentives are set twofold. Quantity incentives are provided via a piece
rate. This rate is determined ex-ante by the firm’s headquarter for each team and
shift separately in order to set incentives, but at the same time to adjust for varying
conditions with respect to weather, field, crop, and demand. Quality incentives are
provided via deductions from team pay for deficient quality as well as through a daily
tournament scheme across teams in which the teams delivering the highest qualities
win (potentially substantial) monetary prizes. Quality is measured by regular pre-
delivery quality checks. The incentive structure is explained in more detail in Section
3.2.
The Experiment The controlled experimental intervention varied the communica-
tion of incentives, while the actual monetary incentive system remained unchanged.
In the pre-intervention (control) situation, managers were informed about the piece
rate pertaining to their team on the respective day when each of them reported
to the firm’s headquarter before the start of his shift. However, there was neither
monitoring whether managers acknowledged this crucial variable, nor whether they
communicated it to their workers. In the experimental treatment, the firm changed
the communication of ex-ante determined piece rates for one month for a randomly
selected group of managers and their respective teams. The intervention ensured
that treated managers and workers received this information as both managers and
their teams were explicitly briefed, and a note stating the current piece rate was
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posted on the harvest machine, visible to the entire team, at the beginning of the
respective shift. Given the experience of managers (who, on average, have worked
for the firm for several years) and given that incentive pay constitutes a substantial
part of their income, standard incentive theory would suggest no effect of the inter-
vention.2 The experimental intervention is described in more detail in Section 3.3,
and Section 4 contains a description of the data and the estimation strategy.
Results We find that the intervention had economically sizable effects. It sig-
nificantly increased output (by about 3.3 – 3.8%) and had a negative (but not
significant) effect on quality (by about 2.4 – 5.4%).3 Moreover, the intervention
significantly increased manager daily compensation (by about 4.0 – 4.4%). These
findings survive a host of robustness checks (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2).
Investigating potential channels for the treatment effects sheds light on how man-
agers change their behavior in response to the intervention (see Section 5.3). In par-
ticular, managers in treated teams start to assign a larger fraction of their workers
to the task of cutting the lettuce (the central and most demanding task in harvesting
lettuce), which approximately accounts for the entire treatment effect on quantity.
Moreover, the change in the communication of quantity incentives appears to lead
to behavior that is more finely adjusted to material incentives (which vary across
days and teams). In contrast, worker behavior and compensation are not affected
by the intervention.
Interpretation In Section 6, we take a closer look at the results to explore why the
(minimally invasive) intervention might have led to the substantial treatment effects
described above. We find evidence that the treatment effects take time to build up
and only fully materialize in the second half of the treatment month. Among others,
this finding suggests that the results are not driven by a Hawthorne effect, where
one would expect to see a response immediately upon impact. Moreover, explana-
tions based on the presumption that either managers or workers infer additional
information – e.g., on the firm’s priorities – from the intervention turn out not to
be fully consistent with the available evidence. Our preferred interpretation, which
seems consistent with all our empirical findings, is that the intervention increased
the salience of the incentive structure to managers: While the piece rate directly
influences their pay, managers face a variety of tasks, and even in the present (rel-
2The pay of the (temporary) harvest workers is entirely incentive-based. The amount of money
they earn while working for the firm constitutes a substantial fraction of their annual income.
3As will be discussed in more detail below, the difference in findings for quantity and quality
might be due to the fact that quality is less precisely measured.
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atively straightforward) production setting the incentive system is complex (with
various incentive instruments for quantity and quality). In addition, beyond the
immediate supervision and direction of workers, managers also have to decide on
the allocation of workers to tasks and to train incoming workers. Apparently, the
experimental intervention refocussed managers’ attention on the incentive system,
thereby allowing them to obtain a higher payoff.
2 Related Literature
In light of the potential interpretation of our findings as a consequence of changes in
the relative salience of incentives, this study contributes to a recent empirical liter-
ature documenting effects of inattention. So far, this literature has mainly focused
on consumption choices and financial decision making; for a survey, see DellaVi-
gna (2009). For example, various authors consider online auctions and show that
bidders are inattentive to relevant information. In particular, in field experiments,
Hossain and Morgan (2006) and Brown, Hossain, and Morgan (2010) document
that, if the salience of shipping costs is low (for example, because they are stated
separately from the price), shipping costs are not fully incorporated into buyers’
bidding decisions. Lee and Malmendier (2011) show that bidders frequently fail to
exercise available (advantageous) “buy-it-now” options. In a similar vein, the degree
of salience of taxes appears to affect consumption behavior. For example, Chetty,
Looney, and Kroft (2009) conduct a field experiment at a grocery store and find
that posting tax-inclusive prices reduces demand. Finkelstein (2009) shows that
reduced salience of road tolls (caused by the introduction of electronic toll collec-
tion systems) leads to higher tolls. There is also evidence that consumers do not
fully appreciate the continuity of price or quality measures, and instead frequently
focus on a coarser grid of (focal) values when making decisions; see e.g., Lacetera,
Pope, and Sydnor (2012) and Pope (2009). In the realm of personal finance, various
studies have documented that behavior varies systematically with the way institu-
tional features are communicated. For example, Karlan, McConnel, Mullainathan,
and Zinman (2010) conduct a field experiment documenting that reminders that are
sent to savings account holders are more effective in changing savings behavior when
they increase the salience of specific expenditures. In another field study, Stango and
Zinman (forthcoming) manipulate the salience of checking overdraft fees by inject-
ing overdraft-related questions into surveys and find that increased salience has the
immediate effect of reducing the likelihood of incurring a fee in the current month.
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Moreover, taking part in multiple overdraft-related surveys seems to build a “stock”
of attention that reduces overdrafts for up to two years. Our paper adds to this line
of research by considering incentive provision within a firm and documenting that
varying the communication of certain aspects of the incentive system substantially
affects performance even in a context with experienced managers.
Another related strand of recent papers investigates the consequences of variation
in the information about incentives that is provided to the workforce (while hold-
ing the monetary incentive system fixed).4 For example, Blanes-i-Vidal and Nossol
(2011) consider a setting where workers are paid piece rates and where management
begins to reveal the relative position of workers in the pay and productivity dis-
tribution. It turns out that this additional information about relative performance
leads to substantial and lasting increases in productivity (e.g., due to social com-
parison processes), even though the material incentives have not changed. In a field
experiment, Barankay (2011) finds strong negative effects of rank information on
performance among male employees. Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul (2013) show
that introducing performance feedback, without changing incentives themselves, has
measurable effects on output. In their study, feedback information generates incen-
tives to change the (endogenous) team composition by making clear the benefits of
assortative matching into teams by ability. Our paper complements these studies be-
cause in our field experiment there was no additional information provided. Instead,
managers had access to the same information in both control and treatment periods,
and our intervention only changed the way this information was communicated.
Finally, Hossain and List (2012) report on a field experiment studying the effects
of the introduction of conditional incentives framed as either “losses” or “gains” in
a Chinese high-tech manufacturing facility. While both are shown to increase pro-
ductivity, performance persistently responds stronger to incentives that are framed
as losses than to identical incentives that are framed as gains. As in our experi-
ment, there is also no additional information provided in Hossain and List (2012),
yet our intervention differs in that there was no variation in terms of the framing of
payments within the scheme, which was in place even before the intervention. This
allows us to focus on the pure effect of the intervention regarding the communication
of the existing incentive system.
4See Kluger and Denisi (1996) for a survey of the psychology literature on the effects of infor-
mation interventions on performance.
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3 Setting and Experimental Design
3.1 Technology and Workforce
The firm where the field experiment was conducted is a large European agricultural
producer that mainly grows vegetables. For the current study, we use data on all
teams that harvest (a certain variety of) lettuce, the firm’s main product. The
harvest season starts in May and ends in November, with June-September being the
peak harvest season.
Harvest Teams Consisting of a Manager and (Temporary) Workers The
harvesting is done using a team technology, where on every day of the week around
10 teams independently harvest lettuce in shifts on different fields in the same ge-
ographical region. Teams are, in general, too far apart from each other to directly
communicate during a given shift. Each team uses a separate harvest machine (that
economizes the entire harvest process) and typically consists of a dedicated manager
(who is a long-term employee of the firm) and more than 30 (temporary) workers,
who fulfill various tasks within the harvest team. In particular, on average 10-12
cutters (standing behind the harvest machine) do the actual harvesting: they cut
the lettuce, put it in a plastic bag, and place it on a conveyor belt, which is attached
to the machine. From there, packers (who sit behind the belt) pack the lettuce in
crates. Crate-staplers subsequently transport the crates to the center of the harvest
machine and put them on palettes (which are then wrapped with foil and put onto a
trailer in front of the harvest machine by the stretchers). The trailer and the harvest
machine are pulled by a tractor.5
The manager as the leader of his respective harvest team identifies a team in our
data. As the other members of the respective harvest team are temporary workers,
team composition varies over the course of the harvest season (as will be discussed
in more detail below). Each manager has a variety of responsibilities. He is the link
between the firm and workers, communicates details about the incentive structure
to workers, is responsible for training of incoming workers, and takes all relevant
operative decisions on the field. For example, within his team he decides on the
allocation of workers to various tasks (i.e., assigns them to be cutters, packers, crate-
staplers, or stretchers). Also, the manager sets the speed of the harvest machine
(and thereby implicitly decides how much lettuce is worth harvesting on a given field
5In the Supplementary Material, we provide a picture of a harvest machine, which, for confi-
dentiality reasons, is not intended for publication (see Figure C.1).
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on a given day). Ultimately, the manager is responsible for the entire performance
of his team in terms of quantity and quality of lettuce harvested.
Workforce, Allocation of Workers to Teams, and Training Unlike managers,
workers generally only stay with the firm for spells of 6-8 weeks of a harvest season.
However, it is not uncommon for workers to return over multiple years in a row
for these short spells. Importantly, before starting to harvest, all incoming workers
receive training that introduces them to the production technology, the various tasks,
and the pertaining incentive structure.6 Workers are mostly from Eastern Europe
(mainly from Poland, Romania, or Ukraine).7 In general, these temporary workers
are recruited in their home towns, e.g., upon recommendation by workers from
previous years. Arrivals and departures at the firm site are organized by the firm
in batches of bus loads to make travel cost-efficient. During their spells the workers
live on the farm at centrally provided lodging sites. Incoming workers are allocated
to managers by the firm’s headquarter (and not by the managers themselves), and
usually stay with their respective manager’s team for their entire spell at the firm.
According to the firm’s headquarter, which team a given worker will join is not a
conscious decision, but basically random and driven by current departures of workers
from the firm site (i.e., in which teams there are openings). Importantly, this implies
that from the perspective of the current paper the allocation of workers to teams
can be seen as exogenous.
3.2 Incentive System: Concerns for Quantity and Quality
Overview The firm cares about both the quantity – higher output increases rev-
enue – and quality – severe contractual penalties would result from inferior quality
delivered to large supermarket chains – of the lettuce harvested. As a consequence,
the firm maintains an elaborate incentive system to provide quantity and quality
incentives to both managers and workers. This incentive system has been in place
for several years prior to our experiment.
In the following, we describe the remuneration of workers. While managers face a
very similar pay structure, we postpone the details pertaining to their remuneration
6New workers typically work on a fixed daily wage for 1 to 2 days (while practicing their task)
and switch to incentive pay thereafter.
7Although there are considerable differences in the production technology (and the respective
product), the composition of the workforce is comparable to the one in Bandiera, Barankay, and
Rasul (2005).
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to the end of this subsection. Importantly, note that for managers firing or promo-
tions, i.e., career concerns, do not appear to be an issue as so far neither of the two
has happened at the firm. In a similar vein, according to the firm, firing of tempo-
rary workers due to a lack in performance is an extremely rare event (which does
not seem to be surprising given the simplicity of the tasks and the attractiveness of
the job in terms of potential earnings).8
Quantity Incentives Incentives for quantity are provided through piece rates for
the amount of lettuce harvested. Piece rates (which are team-day specific) are set
by the firm’s headquarter each day before a given shift begins. Importantly, in the
present firm, piece rates fulfill a twofold purpose. In addition to providing incentives,
the firm has to ensure that workers obtain an average hourly wage above the legal
minimum. Consequently, adjustments are made to the piece rate to account for
varying harvesting conditions, such as the condition of the field (e.g., soil or field
size), crop (e.g., size of the lettuce heads, maturity, or potential damages), as well as
weather conditions.9 For a given team and day, the average hourly pay of a worker
from quantity incentives is given by the piece rate (in terms of lettuce heads) times
the total number of pieces harvested divided by the total number of work hours.10
Quality Incentives The quality of a given team’s output is measured by a one-
dimensional index (the so-called quality (malus) points), where a higher number of
points reflects worse quality of the product (e.g., damaged leaves or brown stains) or
of the harvest process (e.g., compliance with work hygiene). The quality assessment
is conducted by designated quality control staff at the team-day level, post-harvest
and pre-delivery at the firm’s warehouse, as well as on site, where mobile quality
control staff visits each team during each shift, as will be discussed in more detail
in Section 3.3 below.
The number of quality (malus) points affects workers’ pay in two ways. First,
deficient quality reduces a worker’s pay directly through a deduction to the above-
described payment from quantity incentives, where the deduction (per piece har-
vested) is proportional to the assigned number of quality points. Second, there
is a daily quality tournament. In particular, the above-described deductions are
8For example, a Polish worker on average earns more than 40% of the Polish average annual
salary during a typical spell at the firm.
9In practice it is common that piece rates fulfil such purposes; see e.g., related applications in
Paarsch and Shearer (2000) and Shearer (2004).
10For cutters (whose quantity performance is observed at the individual level), there are addi-
tional performance-dependent adjustments.
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paid into a pool. At the end of the harvest day, this pool is distributed through
a tournament among all teams active on the respective day, where the teams with
the best quality performance (the lowest number of quality (malus) points) receive
percentage-shares of the pool (i.e., prizes) that are decreasing in their rank in the
tournament. The fixed-percentage distribution scheme is known to all managers
and workers. However, the absolute size of the prizes is determined endogenously
by the size of the pool, i.e., by the quality performance of all teams on the respective
harvest day. Any payout from the quality tournament is distributed equally among
the workers of a given team.
Specifics of Manager Remuneration Analogous to above, managers receive
quantity incentives (through the piece rate) and quality incentives (through deduc-
tions proportional to the number of quality points and participation in daily quality
tournaments). Compared to workers, quality incentives do, however, receive a larger
weight in managers’ remuneration. In addition, they receive a base wage, which re-
sults from collective bargaining agreements, and they participate in the firm’s “profit
center harvest” (where a certain percentage of the respective harvest day’s profits
is distributed among all managers active on a given day). This latter component
is meant to provide managers with incentives for good maintenance of machinery,
economical usage of material, etc.
3.3 Experimental Implementation
The present paper is the result of an intense interaction with the firm, whose board
could be convinced of the merit of conducting a controlled experiment to evaluate
the effectiveness of the incentive system in place. As the incentive system had been
developed over years, the firm was convinced of its effectiveness. Based on the
discussions in Sections 1 and 2, we suspected, however, that small interventions
in how incentives are communicated might matter. As our proposed experimental
design did not seem to pose a danger of disrupting the production process, it was
approved. Note that neither managers nor workers were informed that they were
exposed to an experimental intervention.
Randomization The experimental treatment was conducted between August 1
- August 31, 2008. The treated population consisted of 5 managers and their re-
spective teams, who were randomly drawn from the set of managers. The control
population consisted of the remaining 5 managers and their respective teams. As ex-
plained in detail below, the experimental intervention changed the way how quantity
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incentives were communicated to treated teams, while keeping the actual monetary
incentive system fixed.
Implementation Outside of August 2008, when managers reported to the firm’s
headquarter before the beginning of their shift, they were informed about their
respective piece rate (as well as about other relevant aspects, such as the relevant
field and the length of their shift). However, there was no monitoring as to whether
managers actually acknowledged this information or whether they communicated
the piece rate to their workers. During the treatment in August 2008, managers still
received the relevant information before the beginning of their shift at the firm’s
headquarter. However, in addition, our intervention made sure that managers and
workers acknowledged the information about the pertaining piece rate. In particular,
the intervention was conducted by the firm’s mobile quality control staff, whose
regular task is to monitor the production process on-site at the various harvest
machines. To this end, it visits each team at the beginning of its respective shift.
Hence, the mobile quality control staff’s visit is not per se perceived as an unexpected
intervention. During the treatment in August, before the shift began, the mobile
quality control staff briefed the respective (treated) manager explicitly about the
pertaining piece rate and posted a note stating the piece rate on the harvest machine
where it was visible to the entire team. Beyond this (and its usual tasks), the mobile
quality control staff did not intervene in the production process.
Our coefficient of interest is the effect of the treatment on the treated teams
compared to the respective outcomes in control teams, i.e., the treatment effect on
the treated.11
4 Data, Predictions, and Empirical Specification
4.1 Data
Our analysis relies on the personnel and performance records for all managers and
workers for the harvest season 2008. The harvest season 2008 lasted from May 25
11Note that while teams are in general too far apart to communicate with each other during
a given shift, communication among teams about incentives (or the intervention itself) after or
before work cannot be ruled out. In principle, through such communication the treatment might
even affect non-treated teams. This, however, should bias any treatment effect towards zero.
Consequently, the results presented below might be viewed as conservative estimates of the true
treatment effects.
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to November 6, 2008, and our unit of observation are data on the team-day level.
As discussed in Section 3.1, a team is identified by its respective manager (because
a given team’s stock of temporary workers fluctuates, where leaving workers are
replaced by current arrivals). In the analysis, we only consider teams that work
on performance pay, eliminating approximately 15% of team-day observations in
which teams are working on fixed wages due to bad conditions or other reasons
unrelated to the intervention.12 This yields 1,182 team-day observations for five
treated teams (534 observations) and five control teams (648 observations), where
in the treatment period of August 2008, for both treated teams and control teams
we have 107 observations each.
All variables (except binary indicator variables and fractions) have been stan-
dardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to protect confidential
firm information.13
As a preliminary step, we investigate whether the randomization of treated and
control teams was successful, and we look for pre-existing trends in the data. As
displayed by Table 1, there is basically no evidence for systematic differences in
observable characteristics between treated teams and control teams prior to the
treatment (where we focus on July 2008, i.e., the month before the treatment). As
all variables reported in Table 1 have been standardized to a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one (on the entire sample), the differences in means in Table 1
can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations. While workers in treated teams
exhibit a slightly shorter tenure in the current season (0.109 standard deviations
below that of control teams), this might be driven by differences in the timing of
arrival and departure of temporary workers, which are randomly allocated to the
various teams.14 However, this difference is unlikely to affect performance given the
12On less than 5% of harvest days a given team had already completed an earlier shift on a
different field on the same day (where such second shifts tend to be short). The analysis below is
based on a sample that drops these 53 (second) observations of a given team on a given day, and
controls for this fact with a dummy variable indicating whether the team worked an additional
second shift on the respective day. When calculating manager daily compensation (which will
be one of our main outcome variables), we also exclude earnings from potential second shifts.
Hence, we base our analysis on variation on the team-day level. Including the second shifts in
the estimation sample (or, alternatively, dropping all teams with multiple shifts on a given day)
delivers virtually identical results, which are available upon request.
13In the Supplementary Material, we report summary statistics of the non-standardized variables
(see Table C.1, which contains confidential information and is included for the convenience of the
referees only). As discussed in Section 5.2, this standardization does not affect results.
14In the non-standardized data, this difference in means corresponds to less than three days.
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Table 1: Balancing Table
Difference in Means p-Value
(Treated Teams
Versus Control Teams)
Piece Rate (in Euros) -0.160 0.25
Total Work Hours -0.081 0.56
Break Time (in Hours) -0.302 0.06
Team Size (in Number of Workers) 0.185 0.23
Workers’ Average Age (in Years) -0.028 0.86
Workers’ Average Tenure in the Current Season (in Days) 0.109 0.02
Workers’ Average Total Tenure (in Number of Seasons) 0.109 0.39
Note: Observations are on the team-day level, where, for confidentiality reasons, all variables (except for dummy
variables and fractions) are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one on the entire sample of
1,182 observations. The table considers observations from July 2008 only (i.e., the month prior to the treatment).
This yields 98 (117) observations for treated teams (control teams), where the p-values refer to t-tests for the null
of equality of means.
simplicity of the tasks and the required (short) training period. Overall, it appears
as if treated teams and control teams did not differ systematically with respect
to personal characteristics and experience of workers or with respect to inputs.
Moreover, there is no evidence that any potential differences between treated teams
and control teams along these dimensions varied systematically across control and
treatment periods. Importantly, incentives in terms of the piece rate set by the firm
do not differ systematically between teams receiving the treatment and teams that
are in the control group, neither before nor during the treatment.15
Figure 1 plots the three outcome variables of interest, namely quantity (Panel
(a)), quality (Panel (b)), and manager daily compensation (Panel (c)) over the course
of the harvest season 2008. The figure allows to make two observations. First, there
do not seem to be differential pre-existing trends between treated teams and control
teams in any of the outcome variables. Second, performance along all three of these
dimensions is subject to pronounced day-to-day fluctuations (e.g., due to substantial
day-to-day changes in harvesting conditions). This suggests that a multivariate
Similarly, the difference in Break Time of 0.3 standard deviations (which is not significant at the
5%-level) translates into a difference of less than 5 minutes.
15The respective p-values from t-tests are 0.13 over the entire season, 0.25 for the month before
the treatment period (July), and 0.78 (0.90) for the treatment period August (after August 1),
respectively.
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(c) Manager Daily Compensation
Note: Observations are on the team-day level, where, for confidentiality reasons, all of the outcome variables are
standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one on the entire sample of 1,182 observations. Panels
(a)-(c) depict time series of the means of the standardized outcome variables for treated teams (straight line) and
control teams (dotted line). The treatment was administered from August 1-31, 2008. Note that in any subset of
observations the mean of the respective outcome variable is not necessarily equal to zero.
regression approach that accounts for systematic variation in observable team and
day characteristics is more appropriate for the identification of the treatment effect
than a comparison of unconditional means. In the empirical analysis below, a full
set of control variables will be used to identify the effects of interest.
4.2 Predictions
Given that the incentive system as described in Section 3.2 has been in place for
several years, that managers are experienced, and that their pay (as well as work-
ers’ pay) is highly incentive-based, standard agency theory suggests that managers
maximize against the incentive scheme. Hence, the null hypothesis is that our (mini-
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mally invasive) experimental variation of the communication of the piece rate should
neither affect managers’ behavior nor their pay.
However, when devising the experiment, we deemed it possible that a change in
the communication of the piece rate might affect managers’ behavior for (at least)
the following two reasons. First, as discussed in Section 2, there is evidence from a
variety of domains (but, so far, not incentive provision in firms) that variations in
salience might affect behavior even in the presence of substantial monetary stakes.
Second, while the piece rate directly influences managers’ pay, they face a variety
of tasks, and even in the present (relatively straightforward) production setting the
incentive system managers face is complex. In particular, as spelled out above, there
are not only quantity incentives through the piece rate, but managers also need to
be concerned about quality (incentivized through deductions from pay and daily
quality tournaments). In addition, beyond the immediate supervision and direction
of workers, managers have to decide on the allocation of workers to tasks and to train
incoming workers. Consequently, it might be that our intervention with respect to
the communication of (quantity) incentives might bring about a change in treated
managers’ behavior.
When testing the null hypothesis, a subtlety arises with respect to the definition
of the control period. The part of the harvest season before the treatment (i.e., May
25 – July 31, 2008) clearly serves as control. However, given that the treatment
constitutes a change in the communication of incentives, and thus potentially in the
manager’s perception of the incentive system, it might be debatable how to deal with
the part of the harvest season after the end of the treatment (i.e., September 1 –
November 6, 2008). Strictly speaking, the experimental treatment was only applied
in August 2008; implying that the period from September 1 onwards should be
viewed as a control period. However, it might be that once the managers’ awareness
of the importance and functioning of incentives had been raised, they changed their
behavior even without being explicitly reminded of daily incentives (as happened
during August 2008). In this case, the entire remainder of the harvest season after
August 1 could be viewed as the treatment period. In order to deal with this issue,
in our regression analysis, we provide results for both interpretations. Moreover,
as a robustness check, we show that our results also hold when we drop the entire
period after August 31.
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4.3 Empirical Specification
The analysis builds on team-day observations, where teams are identified through
their respective manager. Technically, we test the null hypothesis that the change
in the way piece rates were communicated to teams as outlined above had no effect
on performance (as the actual incentives remained unchanged).
In establishing our results, we begin by illustrating the treatment effects graphi-
cally in the data. To this end, we plot raw means of the relevant outcome variables
(quantity, quality, and manager’s pay) across treatment status and period. How-
ever, as is evident from Figure 1, there are substantial day-to-day fluctuations in
the variables of interest (for example, due to changes in environmental conditions),
and hence the variation of the outcome variables is large, which, as discussed above,
suggests that a regression-based identification of the treatment effect is more ap-
propriate. The empirical analysis is based on an estimation model that identifies
the treatment effects of the experimental intervention by ways of a difference-in-
difference approach, where outcomes for treated teams before and under the treat-
ment are compared to those of control teams that did not receive the treatment. The
empirical specification conditions on a rich set of controls to avoid spurious results
driven by systematic heterogeneity. In particular, our empirical model is given by:
Yit = α + β · ITreated Team · ITreatment Period + γi · Ti + δt ·Dt + ρ ·Xit + εit , (1)
where i and t denote team and day, respectively, Yit is the respective outcome
variable, ITreated Team (ITreatment Period) is a binary indicator that is equal to one for
treated teams (during the treatment period) and zero otherwise, Ti is a binary team
indicator (where a team is identified by its manager), Dt is a binary day indicator,
Xit are controls on the team-day level, and εit is an error term. The coefficients to
be estimated are α, β, γi, δt, and ρ, where β is the coefficient of interest as it reflects
the effect of the treatment on the treated.
Note that the controls Xit and the (manager) fixed effects Ti capture distinct
aspects. On the one hand, Ti captures persistent differences that are based in the
person of the manager (e.g., management style or authority). On the other hand, the
(team) controls reflect properties of the team that, for a given manager, might vary
from day to day, e.g., team composition due to departure and arrival of new workers.
Typically, on any given day, these controls will also vary across teams. In particular,
the covariates Xit control for factors that might affect performance, but that in our
setting can be viewed as exogenous from the respective manager’s perspective. This
includes the material incentives in terms of the piece rate set by the firm before
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the respective shift. In order to account for potential productivity differences across
teams, controls also include information regarding (i) team composition in the form
of the average age of workers and the average tenure of workers (in terms of both
the number of days worked in the current season and the overall number of seasons
worked for the firm),16 (ii) the labor force at the disposal of the manager on a given
day (in terms of team size, i.e., the number of workers, and of total work hours),17
and (iii) a binary indicator that is equal to 1 if the team went on to work on a second
shift on the respective day (see Footnote 12 above).
We estimate different versions of model (1). As main specification we present
OLS estimates with robust standard errors, where we allow for correlation of errors
within a harvest day, e.g., due to weather effects or the daily quality tournaments.
In the light of Figure 1, this clustering appears to be an appropriate assumption:
it accounts for the most important source of unobserved heterogeneity, while main-
taining a sufficient number of independent observations (see e.g., Cameron, Gelbach,
and Miller, 2011).
5 Results
In Section 5.1, we establish the effects of the intervention on the main outcome
variables (i.e., quantity and quality of output and manager daily compensation),
and in Section 5.2, we show that the results are robust to alternative specifications.
Then, in Section 5.3, we document various behavioral responses that shed light on
how the treatment effects were moderated.
5.1 Main Results: Treatment Effects on Outcome Variables
Quantity In Figure 2(a) we compare the raw means of quantity harvested in
the control period and the treatment period (of August 2008) for control teams and
treated teams, respectively. Recall that all outcome variables have been standardized
16Recall that, for any given team, these team controls vary over the course of the harvest season
as there is continuous arrival and departure of seasonal workers.
17Note that it is the firm, and not the manager, who has authority to decide on these variables.
Unreported regressions confirm that the treatment did not have any impact on the length of shifts
or breaks (in hours), which might have indicated that (beyond the firm’s directives) managers
had some leeway with respect to total work hours (e.g., in order to increase output if this seemed
profitable). Details are available upon request.
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Note: Observations are on the team-day level, where, for confidentiality reasons, all of the outcome variables are
standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one on the entire sample of 1,182 observations. Panels (a)-
(c) depict means of the standardized outcome variables in the control period (in light grey) and the treatment period
of August (in dark grey) for control teams and treated teams, respectively (and their 95%-confidence intervals). The
treatment was administered between August 1-31, 2008. Note that in any subset of observations the mean of the
respective outcome variable is not necessarily equal to zero.
to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to protect confidential firm
information, which explains why in Figure 2 the outcome variables may take on
negative values.18
While treated teams display somewhat lower performance prior to treatment
when compared to control teams, their performance goes up in August, while that
of the control teams remains virtually unaffected by the treatment. In particular, in
the control period the raw means are 0.097 and -0.146 for control teams and treated
18Also recall that the standardization is on the entire sample of 1,182 observations, and hence
in any subsample the mean is not necessarily zero.
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teams, respectively, and hence there is a difference of 0.243. In the treatment period
of August, the raw means are 0.101 and -0.005; implying a difference of 0.106 between
control teams and treated teams. The treatment effect, in terms of the difference
of differences, thus amounts to 0.137 standard deviations. This corresponds to a
relative daily increase in pieces harvested by treated teams by 3.8%. As is evident
from Figure 2(a), variation in the raw data is, however, large (see also Figure 1).
Consequently, on the basis of the difference-in-difference model (1) laid out in
Section 4.3 and using a full set of controls, we estimate the potential effect of a change
in the communication of incentives on the daily performance of teams in terms of
the total amount of lettuce harvested per day and team (thereby, conditioning out
potentially systematic variation of controls). The treatment effect is the coefficient
on a binary indicator that is equal to 1 for treated teams during the treatment period,
and zero otherwise. Indicator variables for treated teams and the treatment period
are absorbed by team and day indicators. The results are displayed in columns (1)
and (2) of Table 2. Following the discussion at the end of Section 4.2, in column
(1) the month of August is defined as the treatment period, while in column (2) the
remainder of the harvest season after August 1 is defined as the treatment period.
The difference-in-difference approach reveals a statistically significant, positive
treatment effect in the sense that the change in the communication of the piece
rate increases daily performance in the quantity domain by 0.119 – 0.138 standard
deviations (depending on the definition of the treatment period). This is very similar
to the above found effect of 0.137 obtained from comparing the raw means (which,
as will be discussed below, translates into an economically sizable effect).19
The estimated coefficient on the piece rate deserves a comment. In particular,
note that the negative effect of the piece rate on output should not be surprising.
Similar to Shearer (2004), in the present setting the firm sets a higher piece rate
when harvesting conditions are more difficult (and hence, output will be relatively
low) in order to ensure that workers obtain an average hourly wage above the legal
minimum. Hence, the piece rate does not only serve an incentive purpose, but is
also adjusted to the pertaining harvesting conditions. While weather conditions are
likely to be taken up by day fixed effects, there still remain team-day specific factors
19Note that when comparing the residuals of quantity (obtained from estimating regression
model (1) for July 2008 (or for the entire period up to July 31), there is no significant difference
between treated teams and control teams. This suggests that there is no unobserved heterogeneity
once observable heterogeneity is controlled for. The same comment applies to the other outcome
variables, quality (malus) points and manager daily compensation, discussed below.
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Table 2: Main Results
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.138** 0.244* 0.164***
[0.026] [0.082] [0.006]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.119** 0.123 0.149**
[0.019] [0.343] [0.023]
Piece Rate -0.196*** -0.194*** 0.031 0.031 -0.019 -0.017
[0.000] [0.000] [0.518] [0.533] [0.447] [0.506]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.892 0.892 0.446 0.444 0.795 0.796
Note: The table reports OLS estimates, where p-values (shown in square brackets) are based on robust standard
errors that allow for clustering on the day level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level, respectively. Observations are on the team-day level, where, for confidentiality reasons, all variables
(except for dummy variables and fractions) are standardized to a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one on
the entire sample of 1,182 observations. For any given team and day, “Team Controls” include (i) workers’ average
age (in years), (ii) workers’ average total tenure (in number of seasons), (iii) workers’ average tenure in the current
season (in days), (iv) team size (in number of workers), (v) total work hours, and (vi) a dummy variable indicating
whether on the given day the team had a second shift. Due to arrival and departure of (temporary) workers, these
team controls vary on the team-day level. “Treatment Effect” reports the effect of the treatment on the treated,
where we indicate the treatment period under consideration in parentheses.
(e.g., size and condition of the respective field, or size, maturity, and condition of
the crop on a given field), which are not taken up by controls.20
Quality Next, we investigate the effect of the treatment on performance in terms
of quality. Figure 2(b) displays the respective raw means of quality (malus) points
by treatment status and treatment period. In the control period, the raw means
of quality are -0.095 and 0.086 for control teams and treated teams, respectively;
implying a difference of -0.181. In the treatment period of August 2008, the re-
spective means are -0.125 and 0.262; implying a difference of -0.387. Hence, the
20Relating the piece rate to the one-day-ahead forecast of the amount of rainfall (in liters per
square meter) and the daily maximum temperature (in degrees centigrade) for the respective
harvest day in the harvesting area reveals a positive correlation between the forecasted precipitation
and the piece rate (pairwise correlation 0.14, p-value< 0.01) and a negative correlation between the
forecasted maximum temperature and the piece rate (pairwise correlation before September 1 is
-0.18, p-value<0.01, and -0.07, p-value<0.02 over the entire season). However, note that the effect
of current weather on both current and future harvesting conditions is fairly complicated, and
hence only certain combinations of weather conditions will affect harvesting conditions negatively.
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resulting treatment effect on the treated corresponds to 0.205 standard deviations
(which corresponds to an increase in quality (malus) points by 4.6%). That is, the
comparison of the raw means suggests that, while the quality performance of con-
trol teams does hardly vary across the control period and the treatment period of
August, the number of quality (malus) points of treated teams goes up (and hence
quality goes down) in August. Again, variation is large.
To more precisely determine the treatment effect on quality we estimate the
difference-in-difference model (1) with a full set of controls. Results are displayed in
columns (3) – (4) of Table 2, where we use the same specifications as for quantity.
Here, the dependent variable is quality (malus) points; and recall that a higher
number of points corresponds to lower quality. As suggested by the comparison of
raw means above, we observe an increase in quality (malus) points by 0.12 – 0.24
standard deviations (which corresponds to 2.7 – 5.4% lower quality). However, the
treatment effect is still fairly imprecisely measured. Overall, the performance of the
empirical model is weaker for quality than for quantity, which is also suggested by
the comparably low R-squared. This might partly be driven both by the discrete
(and coarse) nature of quality (malus) points as the firm’s quality measure and by
noise in their measurement (due to random sampling by the firm’s quality control
staff).
Nonetheless, when interpreting the treatment effects qualitatively, there is an
indication that the change in the communication of incentives leads to a higher
priority for quantity at the (potential) cost of quality. Given that the managers
are experienced and their pay is heavily incentive-based, it seems quite surprising
that our minimal informational intervention should have any effect. In order to
investigate whether the treatment indeed led managers to better optimize against
the incentive system, in a next step, we look at how it affected managers’ pay.
Manager Daily Compensation Ceteris paribus, a manager’s pay is increasing
in both quantity and quality, which, given the discussion above, suggests that the
treatment had countervailing effects on manager daily compensation. We first il-
lustrate the effect of the treatment on manager daily compensation in Figure 2(c),
which displays the raw means for the two groups and periods. The comparison of
raw means during the control period reveals a difference between control teams and
treated teams of 0.378 (0.177 versus -0.201). In August, this difference is 0.243
(0.076 versus -0.167), which implies a positive treatment effect on the treated of
0.133 standard deviations (which corresponds to an increase in daily compensation
of about 3.5%). Estimation results for the effect of the treatment on manager daily
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compensation using the full set of controls are reported in columns (5) and (6) of
Table 2. We find a statistically significant, positive treatment effect of 0.15 – 0.16
standard deviations, which, again, is similar to what is suggested by the compar-
ison of raw means. Economically, the effect corresponds to a rise in daily pay of
4 – 4.4%. This finding seems to indicate that our (minimally invasive) treatment
led managers to better optimize against the incentive scheme (an issue that will be
studied in more detail in Section 5.3).
Economic Significance of Effects As discussed above, we find that, as a response
to the treatment, quantity goes up by 3.3 – 3.8% relative to the (unconditional) mean
and manager daily compensation goes up by 4 – 4.4% relative to the (unconditional)
mean. Depending on the definition of the treatment period, the reduction in quality
is marginally significant or insignificant, at the order of 2.4 – 5.4% relative to the
(unconditional) mean. To put these effects into perspective, note that to achieve a
comparable increase in quantity, the firm would have to add one additional worker
to each team – having to bear the cost of this additional worker.21 Hence, the
estimated effects appear to be economically sizable.
5.2 Robustness
In this section, we perform various checks that document that our main results as
presented in Table 2 are robust. All respective regression tables are relegated to the
Supplementary Material (for potential publication in an online appendix).
Restriction to the Sample up to August 31 As discussed in Section 4.2,
one could argue that the remainder of the harvest season after August 31 is not a
control period, but should be viewed as part of the treatment period: While the
actual intervention stopped on August 31 (which would speak for viewing it as a
control period), the treatment – according to our preferred interpretation – might
have raised the salience of (quantity) incentives for managers even in the absence
of the daily reminders (which would speak for counting it as part of the treatment
period). To get around this subtlety, we demonstrate that our results still persist
when we restrict attention to the sample up to August 31. As Table R.1 shows,
compared to Table 2, the treatment effects on quantity, quality, and manager daily
compensation are of similar size, and in the cases of quantity and manager daily
compensation they are highly significant as before.
21This back-of-the-envelope calculation is based upon the estimated effect of team size on pieces
harvested. Details are available upon request.
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Manager-Specific Linear Time Trends In our main specification, we include
full sets of manager dummies and day dummies. In Table R.2, we report regressions
where we also consider manager-specific linear time trends.22 In particular, specifi-
cations in Panel A (Panel B) of Table R.2 include manager dummies and manager-
specific linear time trends (manager dummies, manager-specific linear time trends,
and day dummies). Again, the results are similar to before.
Alternative Formats of Variables In Table R.3, we report regressions where the
non-standardized variables (except for dummy variables) have been log-transformed,
and coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The results are qualitatively iden-
tical and even quantitatively very close to the results obtained with standardized
variables. In unreported regressions, we have verified that the results are also robust
when using the non-standardized variables directly.
Alternative Clustering of Error Terms The results in Section 5 are based on
clustering of error terms on the day level. We think this is appropriate as there are
substantial day-to-day variations in the data (while outcomes for managers largely
co-move). This suggests that harvest conditions (such as weather) are correlated
across teams on a given day. In Table R.4, we redo the analysis of Table 2 but,
instead, we cluster on the team level (Panel A) or the day-team level (Panel B).
This yields identical point estimates, but different standard errors. As Table R.4
shows we obtain similar results, but somewhat lower significance levels in the case
of day-team clustering.23
GLS Estimates To show that our results are not driven by the OLS specification,
we also present GLS estimates that allow for team-specific AR(1) disturbances and
heteroscedasticity across teams. Table R.5 shows that the GLS results parallel
the OLS findings for quantity, quality, and manager daily compensation: quantity
increases significantly in response to the treatment, quality decreases (but the effect
is less precisely estimated), while manager daily compensation increases significantly.
System Estimation of Quantity and Quality As the teams face a multi-tasking
problem (i.e., harvesting a large quantity at a high quality) estimating quantity
22Additionally allowing for manager-specific quadratic time trends does not affect results.
23Given that our specification contains both manager fixed effects and day fixed effects, clustering
standard errors on team (manager) and day might be considered overly conservative. As noted
by Thompson (2011), two-way clustered standard errors have less bias, but exhibit more variance.
Moreover, given the panel structure with large T (days) and small N (teams), clustering on teams
might be restrictive (see, e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Ch.8).
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and quality jointly might be more efficient.24 Therefore, Table R.6 presents the
results from SUR estimations of quantity and quality outcomes for specifications
with August as treatment period (Columns (1) and (2) of Panels A and B) as
well as for the entire harvest season after August 1 as treatment period (Columns
(3) and (4) of Panels A and B), where specifications in Panel B include quality
(quantity) in the quantity (quality) regressions as additional controls (while this
is not the case in Panel A). However, the treatment effects are unaffected by this
and quantitatively and qualitatively almost identical when omitting these controls.
Moreover, the treatment effects from the SUR estimations are very close to the
coefficients in the baseline specifications reported in Table 2, and the results are
statistically more significant as would be expected as system estimation is more
efficient.25
Placebo Tests To check whether the treatment picks up some spurious effects,
we perform several placebo tests. First, we consider placebo treatment periods and
counterfactually define “July 1-31” respectively “after July 1” as treatment periods.
As revealed by Panel A of Table R.7 neither of the treatment effects is significant
at a conventional level for either of the two placebo treatment periods. Second, as a
further placebo test, instead of considering the actually treated teams, we randomly
draw five teams and proceed as if they had been treated. Again, it is reassuring
that Panel B of Table R.7 shows that neither of the treatment effects is significant
given a placebo selection of treated teams.
5.3 Behavioral Responses to the Treatment
So far, we have documented that there are systematic effects of the intervention on
the main outcome variables, i.e., a higher quantity harvested and higher manager
daily compensation (with imprecise adverse effects on quality). In this section we
investigate which behavioral responses to the treatment might have led to these
effects.
Task Assignment by the Manager Within his team, the respective manager
24While it is not the aim of the present study to test the theory of multi-tasking (see e.g.,
Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), there is a trade-off between quantity (well measured) and quality
(imprecisely measured) in our data, and behavioral patterns are consistent with the basic premises
of the theory. For a recent experimental test of the multi-tasking model, see e.g., Hong, Hossain,
List, and Tanaka (2013).
25However, standard errors do not account for clustering and should be seen as a lower bound.
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has all relevant decision rights on the field. If a manager intends to harvest a larger
quantity, he has only a limited number of ways to achieve this. First, he could com-
municate to workers that he deems a lower quality threshold acceptable (thereby
pushing quantity). However, while suggestive, we only find noisy evidence for effects
of the treatment on quality (see columns (3) and (4) of Table 2). Second, he could
make individual cutters (i.e., the workers who do the actual cutting, and hence most
directly influence the quantity harvested) work harder (e.g., by raising the speed of
the harvest machine). We can look into this because the quantity performance of
cutters is measured at the individual level (by counting the plastic bags, in which
they put the lettuce heads). However, unreported regressions show that there is no
treatment effect on the pieces harvested by individual cutters. Finally, as he has the
authority to decide on task allocation within his team, if a manager deems a higher
quantity desirable, he could assign a larger fraction of workers to do the actual cut-
ting (and a lower fraction to the packing and processing of the harvested crop). In
order to investigate this latter channel, Table 3 reports estimation results where we
regress the fraction of workers in the team that act as cutters on the treatment effect
and the same full set of controls as before. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 (which
only differ in the definition of the treatment period) show that as a response to the
treatment managers indeed seem to re-focus attention on quantity by assigning a
significantly larger fraction of their workforce to the role of cutter – the most phys-
ically demanding task – than they otherwise would have done. Economically, the
coefficients in Columns (1) and (2) imply that the treatment increased the fraction
of cutters by roughly one percentage point. A back-of-the-envelope calculation on
the basis of the non-standardized data indicates that this increase on average cor-
responds to one third of a worker additionally being assigned to be a cutter, which,
given the average quantity performance per cutter, approximately accounts for the
entire treatment effect on quantity.
Responsiveness of the Performance to Quantity Incentives Above, we have
documented that the experimental intervention led to a stronger emphasis of man-
agers on quantity output. Absent the intervention, it might have been the case
that, due to their various responsibilities and perhaps a too strong focus on the
daily quality tournaments, managers somewhat underappreciated the relevance of
the quantity dimension. As discussed in Section 3.2, the firm’s headquarter sets the
piece rate with the dual purpose of providing quantity incentives and adjusting for
varying harvesting conditions, and there is variation in the piece rate at the team-
day level. Hence, a change in the communication of quantity incentives might not
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Table 3: Task Assignment by the Manager
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Cutters in the Team
(1) (2)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.009***
[0.003]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.010***
[0.000]
Piece Rate -0.002 -0.002
[0.123] [0.156]
Manager Dummies YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES
Team Controls YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.483 0.485
Note: The note below Table 2 applies.
only lead to higher quantity per se, but it might also be that, as a result of the inter-
vention, managers more finely adjust their behavior to variations in the piece rate
(which, according to Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2, significantly affects quantity).
If this channel was indeed in effect, the treatment should lead to quantity output
being more closely correlated with the piece rate.
Table 4 presents results that test this hypothesis by estimating the baseline speci-
fication of Table 2 where, in addition, we include interaction terms between the treat-
ment effect and the piece rate. It turns out that the interaction terms in Columns
(1) and (2) are positive (and of similar size). This means that the treatment effect
on quantity is stronger (weaker) if piece rates are higher (lower), i.e., quantity in-
centives are stronger (weaker). However, only in Column (2) the interaction effect
is significant at the 5%-level, while in Column (1) the respective p-value is 0.130.
These findings might cautiously be interpreted as indicative of more fine-tuning of
quantity performance to varying incentives in response to the treatment.
A Closer Look at Manager Daily Compensation In a next step, we look in
more detail into how the increase in manager daily compensation comes about. On
the one hand, it could be that the positive effect on manager daily compensation is
mechanically driven by the positive treatment effect on quantity documented above.
On the other hand, managers take all of the main (operative) decisions about the
relevant harvest parameters (e.g., the speed of the harvest machine or the allocation
of workers to tasks), which, in principle, allows them to fine-tune their behavior.
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Table 4: Responsiveness of the Quantity Performance to the Piece Rate
Dependent Variable: Pieces Harvested
(1) (2)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.180**
[0.011]
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) x Piece Rate 0.149
[0.130]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.127**
[0.013]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) x Piece Rate 0.134**
[0.044]
Piece Rate -0.204*** -0.236***
[0.000] [0.000]
Manager Dummies YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES
Team Controls YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.893 0.894
Note: The note below Table 2 applies.
Hence, the treatment might potentially have led managers to overall respond better
to incentives. Table 5 aims to shed light on this. There, we report estimations where
manager daily compensation is regressed on quantity, quality, the treatment effect,
and the same set of control variables as before. Column (1) of Table 5 confirms that,
as suggested by the design of the incentive system, manager daily compensation is
increasing in pieces harvested and decreasing in quality (malus) points. In Columns
(2) and (3), we additionally include the treatment effect (for the two definitions of
the treatment period under consideration). Reassuringly, the coefficients on pieces
harvested and quality (malus) points are very stable across Columns (1)-(3). The
positive treatment effects in Columns (2) and (3) indicate that, as a result of the
intervention, managers were able to raise their pay beyond the direct effects of
quantity and quality.
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Table 5: A Closer Look at Manager Daily Compensation
Dependent Variable: Manager Daily Compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.120**
[0.022]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.105*
[0.087]
Pieces Harvested 0.444*** 0.438*** 0.438***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Quality (Malus) Points -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.066***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Piece Rate 0.068* 0.069* 0.070**
[0.056] [0.054] [0.047]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.818 0.818 0.819
Note: The note below Table 2 applies.
6 Potential Mechanisms
In Section 5, we have established the treatment effects on the main outcome vari-
ables, and we have explored the behavioral responses the intervention appears to
have triggered. In the present section, we consider various potential mechanisms
that might explain why the treatment had the observed effects.
Managers Infer Additional Information One reason why managers might
have changed their behavior could, in principle, be that the treatment conveyed
additional information to them; not in terms of hard, material information on the
incentive system but in terms of the firm’s attitude towards quantity performance.
In principle, managers might have interpreted the firm’s re-iteration of quantity
incentives as a renewed focus on this dimension (perhaps relative to quality) and
as a reminder to more closely follow the prevailing piece rate.26 While such an
explanation would be consistent with our findings on the (per se) effects on quantity
and quality, task allocation, and fine-tuning to variations in the piece rate, it does
26Importantly, at no point in the harvest season the firm issued any communication to this effect,
which, otherwise, might have supported such an interpretation. Also, recall that, in the present
context, career concerns do not seem to play a role for managers (see the discussion in Section 3.2).
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not seem to be able to account for other findings.27
First, if managers had interpreted the treatment as a sign by the firm to more
strongly focus on quantity, one would expect the treatment to have an immediate
effect upon impact (i.e., at the beginning of August). To investigate this, we split
the treatment period of August 2008 into two-week sub-periods to see whether we
find differential effects. Table 6 presents results for this specification (where the
same full set of controls as in Table 2 is employed). In the second half of August,
the coefficients of the treatment effects on quantity (Column (1)) and manager daily
compensation (Column (3)) are relatively large and highly significant, while in the
first half of August they are smaller and insignificant. The treatment effect on
quality (Column (2)) is stable across the subperiods, but weakly significant in the
second half of August only. Taken together these findings suggest that the treatment
effects did not set in right away but needed time to build up, which does not seem
to be consistent with managers inferring additional information.
Table 6: Dynamic Structure of the Treatment Effects
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-15) 0.016 0.249 0.098
[0.830] [0.293] [0.134]
Treatment Effect (Aug 16-31) 0.244*** 0.239* 0.222***
[0.001] [0.069] [0.004]
Piece Rate -0.197*** 0.031 -0.019
[0.000] [0.517] [0.439]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.893 0.446 0.796
Note: The note below Table 2 applies.
Second, as indicated by Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 and by Table 5, the treat-
ment also led to higher compensation for treated managers (in particular, an increase
beyond the pure quantity and quality effects). If, absent the treatment, managers
27For similar reasons to those discussed in the following, an “Experimenter Demand Effect” does
not seem to be able to fully explain the findings. Moreover, managers were not aware that they
took part in an experiment.
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had perfectly optimized against the incentive scheme, one might expect manager
daily compensation to fall as a response to an exogenously induced stronger empha-
sis on quantity.28 This suggests that the observed treatment effects are not a purely
“mechanical” response by managers to an altered belief on the firm’s priorities.29
Hawthorne Effect In principle, the results could also be driven by some form of
“Hawthorne Effect”, i.e., it could be that there is a response simply due to the fact
that there was some intervention.30 However, again, various pieces of evidence do
not seem to support such an explanation. For example, if only a Hawthorne Effect
was at work, again one would expect a response immediately upon introduction of
the intervention on August 1. As is evident from Table 6, this is not the case. Also,
teams do not only react to the treatment (and a potential “surprise” caused by it)
by harvesting a higher quantity per se, but they seem to display a more elaborate
response to the posting of the piece rate. In particular, as Table 4 indicates, they
appear to more strongly fine-tune their behavior to fluctuations in the piece rate
(e.g., harvest less when the piece rate is lower). In a similar vein, as a response to
the treatment, managers not only harvest a higher quantity, but also seem to better
optimize against the incentive scheme; thereby realizing a higher compensation (as
is evident from the significant positive treatment effects in Columns (2) and (3) of
Table 5).
Workers Infer Additional Information While both the respective manager and
his workers had every incentive to learn the pertaining piece rate, in principle, it
could be that, absent the treatment, managers failed to communicate this important
piece of information to their workers at the beginning of the respective shift. If this
indeed would have been the case, the intervention would also have provided workers
with additional information, which could be yet another mechanism causing the
28Importantly, recall that piece rates do not differ systematically between treated teams and
control teams neither before nor during the treatment period (see Footnote 15 and the respective
discussion).
29An auxiliary survey could, in principle, have been helpful to investigate this in more detail.
However, in the context of the current study evaluating such a change in beliefs via a survey would
have been problematic. Asking directly about (the role of) quantity incentives would immediately
have made them more prominent (see e.g., the discussion of Stango and Zinman, forthcoming, in
Section 2). Moreover, given the continuous arrival and departure of (temporary) workers through-
out the harvest season, any survey would have been difficult to administer and might have revealed
(to both managers and workers) that an experiment was conducted. Finally, conducting a survey
was considered too disruptive by the firm.
30Levitt and List (2011) provide a (critical) assessment of the original Hawthorne study.
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observed treatment effects. However, again, various aspects make it unlikely that
this is a comprehensive explanation for our findings. First, given that both managers’
and workers’ pay is heavily incentive-based, we deem such a lack of communication as
very unlikely.31 Second, the evidence on task allocation in Table 3 indicates that as a
response to the treatment managers change their behavior (i.e., it is also managers
who seem to act differently in response to the treatment).32 Finally, one might
suspect that workers holding additional information would only have effects if they
were able to affect what happens on the field (i.e., influence the manager’s decision
making). In turn, if they were indeed able to do so, one would expect them to also
benefit from any implemented changes. However, additional unreported regressions
display no treatment effect on worker daily compensation (or on the compensation
of the subset of cutters within a team).
Higher Salience of (Quantity) Incentives to Managers The mechanisms
discussed so far cannot fully explain the available evidence; suggesting that there is
another (additional) mechanism at work. Given the evidence from other domains,
such as personal finance or consumer choices (see Section 2), and given the many
demands on a manager’s time in the present multi-tasking context (see Section 4.2),
the treatment might have made (quantity) incentives more salient to managers;
thereby affecting behavior. Moreover, it seems that a salience-based explanation is
consistent with all of the available evidence. The posting of the piece rate during
the treatment period seems to have led managers to re-focus on the specifics of the
incentive system. As a response, they adapted their behavior, e.g., they chose a
different allocation of tasks within the team and more finely tuned behavior towards
variations in the piece rate. Thereby, they better optimized against the incentive
scheme and were able to raise their compensation. Moreover, as, beginning on
August 1, the posting of the piece rate was repeated on every day of August, it seems
plausible that higher salience of the incentives gradually built up, which would be
consistent with the dynamic structure of the treatment effect documented above.
Hence, our experiment seems to indicate that, even in the context of incentive
provision (with high-powered incentives and experienced managers) salience plays
an important role.
31Note that according to the firm’s internal guide book for managers “it is the responsibility of
the manager to inform all workers about the piece rate before the shift begins”.
32Also, recall the result, discussed in Section 5.3, that there is no treatment effect on the number
of pieces harvested by individual cutters.
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7 Conclusion
This paper reports on evidence from a randomized intervention in a real (team)
production setting where experienced agents work under a sophisticated incentive
system in a high-stakes environment. Our findings indicate that a mild change in
the way how an important component of the incentive system, the piece rate, is
communicated (while keeping the material incentive system unchanged) has signif-
icant and statistically robust effects on performance. We find that a change in the
communication of the piece rate component of the incentive system increases output
(quantity) and manager compensation, while having an adverse (though less pre-
cisely measured) effect on quality. These economically meaningful effects – e.g., the
treatment effect on quantity corresponds to what would be achieved by adding one
additional worker to the team – seem to be moderated via a changed assignment of
tasks by the manager within his team and an increased responsiveness of output to
variations in the piece rate.
We discuss various alternative interpretations of our findings but conclude that
a salience-based mechanism is best able to explain the full set of our empirical find-
ings. In repeating relevant information that was already available to managers, the
intervention likely increased the managers’ awareness of the particular incentives on
a given day and the information contained in its day-to-day adjustments. Recently,
theories have been formulated, see e.g., Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012) or
Koszegi and Szeidl (2013), to model the effects of limited attention or salience on be-
havior. Broadly speaking, in these models, the decision maker’s attention is drawn
to payoffs that markedly “stand out” and decisions are accordingly tilted towards
these salient payoffs. Our preferred interpretation of the empirical findings is consis-
tent with these theories. By extending these recent theories to problems of incentive
design, it should be possible to derive more specific predictions relevant to firm con-
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Supplementary Material
Regression Tables of Robustness Checks:
For Potential Publication in an Online Appendix
Table R.1: Robustness (Restriction to the Sample up to August 31)
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.218*** 0.245 0.208**
[0.007] [0.187] [0.023]
Piece Rate -0.245*** -0.056 0.012
[0.000] [0.381] [0.759]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES
Observations 692 692 692
R-squared 0.888 0.455 0.744
Note: The note below Table 2 applies.
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Table R.2: Robustness (Manager-Specific Linear Time Trends)
PANEL A: MANAGER-SPECIFIC LINEAR TIME TRENDS AND MANAGER DUMMIES
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.200*** 0.268 0.218***
[0.001] [0.107] [0.001]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.172** 0.812*** 0.133
[0.048] [0.003] [0.219]
Piece Rate -0.281*** -0.281*** 0.203*** 0.224*** -0.022 -0.024
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.317] [0.293]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Manager-Specific Linear Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies NO NO NO NO NO NO
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.844 0.897 0.126 0.139 0.736 0.733
PANEL B: MANAGER-SPECIFIC LINEAR TIME TRENDS, MANAGER DUMMIES, AND DAY DUMMIES
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.105* 0.205 0.225***
[0.075] [0.149] [0.000]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.103 0.446* 0.246**
[0.289] [0.055] [0.014]
Piece Rate -0.188*** -0.188*** 0.043 0.045 -0.007 -0.009
[0.000] [0.000] [0.361] [0.354] [0.777] [0.737]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Manager-Specific Linear Time Trends YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.897 0.897 0.458 0.459 0.803 0.802
Note: The note below Table 2 applies.
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Table R.3: Robustness (Log-Transformed Variables)
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.054*** 0.056 0.050*
[0.009] [0.221] [0.077]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.034*** 0.038 0.045
[0.008] [0.308] [0.219]
Piece Rate -0.461* -0.458 0.053 0.057 -0.101 -0.093
[0.094] [0.104] [0.596] [0.586] [0.130] [0.152]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.907 0.906 0.440 0.440 0.818 0.818
Note: The note below Table 2 applies with the only exception that, here, we use non-standardized variables that
have been log-transformed (except for dummy variables). Hence, coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.
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Table R.4: Robustness (Alternative Clustering of Standard Errors)
PANEL A: CLUSTERING ON THE TEAM LEVEL
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.138** 0.244 0.164**
[0.029] [0.182] [0.050]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.119*** 0.123 0.149
[0.003] [0.414] [0.240]
Piece Rate -0.196*** -0.194*** 0.031 0.031 -0.019 -0.017
[0.001] [0.001] [0.415] [0.452] [0.418] [0.451]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.892 0.892 0.446 0.444 0.795 0.796
PANEL B: CLUSTERING ON THE DAY-TEAM LEVEL
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.138* 0.244 0.164*
[0.072] [0.246] [0.073]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.119** 0.123 0.149
[0.021] [0.483] [0.266]
Piece Rate -0.196*** -0.194*** 0.031 0.031 -0.019 -0.017
[0.001] [0.001] [0.610] [0.636] [0.555] [0.594]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.892 0.892 0.446 0.444 0.795 0.796
Note: The note below Table 2 applies with the only exception that, here, we do not consider robust standard errors
that allow for clustering on the day level, but instead in Panel A (Panel B), p-values, shown in square brackets, are
based on robust standard errors that allow for clustering on the team level (day and team level).
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Table R.5: Robustness (GLS Estimates)
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.134** 0.204 0.188**
[0.029] [0.119] [0.024]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.111** 0.110 0.173**
[0.027] [0.304] [0.012]
Piece Rate -0.187*** -0.187*** 0.045 0.045 -0.008 -0.007
[0.001] [0.001] [0.180] [0.180] [0.697] [0.738]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
Note: The note below Table 2 applies with the only exception that, here, we do not report OLS estimates, but
instead we report GLS estimates, where p-values (shown in square brackets) are based on robust standard errors
that allow for team-specific AR(1) disturbances and heteroscedasticity across teams.
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Table R.6: Robustness (System Estimation of Quantity and Quality)
PANEL A: WITHOUT QUANTITY AND QUALITY AS CONTROLS
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Pieces Quality (Malus)
Harvested Points Harvested Points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.129** 0.238**
[0.011] [0.040]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.113*** 0.108
[0.008] [0.260]
Piece Rate -0.197*** 0.029 -0.196*** 0.028
[0.001] [0.399] [0.001] [0.415]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
PANEL B: WITH QUANTITY AND QUALITY AS CONTROLS
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Pieces Quality (Malus)
Harvested Points Harvested Points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.129** 0.237**
[0.012] [0.041]
Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.112*** 0.106
[0.008] [0.269]
Piece Rate -0.197*** 0.031 -0.196*** 0.031
[0.001] [0.410] [0.001] [0.400]
Pieces Harvested 0.006 0.015
[0.924] [0.824]
Quality (Malus) Points 0.001 0.003
[0.924] [0.824]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
Note: The note below Table 2 applies with the only exception that, here, we do not report OLS estimates, but instead
we report estimates from seemingly unrelated regression models, where p-values are shown in square brackets.
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Table R.7: Robustness (Placebo Tests)
PANEL A: PLACEBO TREATMENT PERIODS
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Treatment Effect (Jul 1-31) 0.044 -0.227 -0.063
[0.481] [0.150] [0.472]
Placebo Treatment Effect (after Jul 1) 0.025 -0.299 -0.76
[0.781] [0.264] [0.583]
Piece Rate -0.199*** -0.268*** 0.029 -0.022 -0.021 0.056
[0.000] [0.000] [0.564] [0.769] [0.395] [0.287]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.892 0.895 0.445 0.441 0.795 0.717
PANEL B: PLACEBO TREATMENT TEAMS
Dependent Variable: Pieces Quality (Malus) Manager Daily
Harvested Points Compensation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Placebo Treatment Effect (Aug 1-31) 0.023 -0.151 -0.052
[0.685] [0.236] [0.409]
Placebo Treatment Effect (after Aug 1) 0.105 -0.108 -0.025
[0.758] [0.310] [0.713]
Piece Rate -0.198*** -0.199*** 0.025 0.027 -0.023 -0.022
[0.000] [0.000] [0.611] [0.574] [0.367] [0.381]
Manager Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Day Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Team Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182 1,182
R-squared 0.892 0.892 0.444 0.444 0.795 0.794
Note: The note below Table 2 applies with the only exception that, here, we do not report actual treatment effects,
but instead in Panel A,“Placebo Treatment Effect” indicates the effect if, counterfactually, July 1-31 respectively
the period after July 1 are considered as treatment periods. In Panel B, we report the effects if, counterfactually,
another random draw of five teams (out of all 10 teams) is viewed as treated.
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Confidential Information: For Referees Only
In the following, we provide confidential firm information that is not intended for
publication, but for the convenience of the referees only. Figure C.1 depicts the
rear view of the harvest machine. Harvesting takes place on fields that, on average,
contain roughly 72,000 lettuce heads per hectare, two-thirds of which are typically
of sufficiently good quality to be harvested. A high yield (in terms of the share of
lettuces actually harvested) is one of the objectives of the firm, but the implementa-
tion is under the discretion of the respective manager. Table C.1 contains summary
statistics of the non-standardized data on the team-day level.







Table C.1: Summary Statistics of the Non-Standardized Data
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Pieces Harvested 34,560 9,636
Quality (Malus) Points 18.65 4.16
Manager Daily Compensation (in Euros) 82.78 22.28
Piece Rate (in Euros per Crate) 0.538 0.044
Total Work Hours 8.00 2.06
Break Time (in Hours) 0.58 0.26
Team Size (in Number of Workers) 33.1 1.49
Fraction of Team Working as Cutters 0.356 0.029
Workers’ Average Age (in Years) 29.77 2.65
Workers’ Average Tenure in the Current Season (in Days) 54.58 26.95
Workers’ Average Total Tenure (in Number of Seasons) 1.84 0.62
Note: Observations are on the team-day level (N = 1, 182). As some of the workers in a given team (such as drivers
or crate-staplers) might be permanent employees of the firm, note that the cutters’ “average tenure in the current
season” (in days) is 44.28 (with a standard deviation of 26.33). The piece rate (in Euros per crate) translates into
the piece rate per lettuce head by dividing it by the target number of lettuce heads per crate (6-8 depending on
crop conditions), which is also set by the firm’s headquarter at the team-day level.
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